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There is rapidly growing evidence that schizophrenia involves changes in context-sensitive
gain-control and probabilistic inference. In addition to the well-known cognitive
disorganization to which these changes lead, basic aspects of vision are also impaired,
as discussed by other papers on this Frontiers Research Topic. The aim of this paper is to
contribute to our understanding of such findings by examining five central hypotheses.
First, context-sensitive gain-control is fundamental to brain function and mental life.
Second, it occurs in many different regions of the cerebral cortex of many different
mammalian species. Third, it has several computational functions, each with wide
generality. Fourth, it is implemented by several neural mechanisms at cellular and
circuit levels. Fifth, impairments of context-sensitive gain-control produce many of the
well-known symptoms of schizophrenia and change basic processes of visual perception.
These hypotheses suggest why disorders of vision in schizophrenia may provide insights
into the nature and mechanisms of impaired reality testing and thought disorder in
psychosis. They may also cast light on normal mental function and its neural bases.
Limitations of these hypotheses, and ways in which they need further testing and
development, are outlined.
Keywords: cognitive coordination, context-sensitivity, gain-control, perceptual grouping, coherence, vision,
schizophrenia, cortical computation
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is well-known to be associated with disorganized
and incoherent patterns of thought and behavior, but it is also
associated with perceptual impairments that are less well-known
because they are less obvious to casual observation. Substantial
perceptual impairments have been rigorously demonstrated using
many different experimental paradigms, however, and may con-
stitute a core component of the illness. Furthermore, as so much
is known at both psychological and neurobiological levels about
the perceptual processes involved it may be easier to gain a deep
understanding of those impairments than it is of the more obvi-
ous higher-level symptoms. If, as we argue here, perceptual and
higher cognitive impairments arise from the same underlying
pathophysiology, then this will show how perceptual impair-
ments can provide a window on the disorder in general. The
pathophysiology that we hypothesize to underlie many aspects
of schizophrenia is centered on context-sensitive gain-control.
Therefore, before reviewing evidence implicating it in schizophre-
nia, we provide an in-depth review of the arguments and evi-
dence for its central role in normal mental life. Furthermore,
we claim that schizophrenia research casts new light on context-
sensitive gain-control, and assessment of that claim requires ade-
quate knowledge of current views concerning its functions and
mechanisms.
Put most simply, the perspective that we have been develop-
ing since the mid 1990s proposes that the coherent organization
of mental life depends upon coordinating neural interactions of
context-sensitive gain-control that amplify relevant signals and
suppress irrelevant signals. Thus, disorganization and incoher-
ence occur when those coordinating interactions are impaired,
as in schizophrenia. Several other researchers in basic neuro-
science have also argued that gain modulation, or gain-control,
is a major principle underlying brain function (e.g., Salinas and
Sejnowski, 2001; Chance et al., 2002). Gain-control changes the
rate at which a neuron’s output increases with the strength of
the driving inputs to which it is selectively tuned. This suggests
that neurons have two classes of input: one specifying selectivity
and the other controlling gain. There is evidence that neuronal
selectivity is specified by synaptic inputs that are few but strong
whereas gain-control depends on many inputs that are indi-
vidually weak (Lee and Sherman, 2010; Phillips et al., 2010).
Gain-controlling inputs include those from the classical neuro-
modulators that have long been associated with the psychoses.
Our theory also emphasizes gain-controlling interactions within
and between glutamatergic and GABAergic neurons, however,
because it is only they that convey the detailed cognitive content
whose coherence is compromised in schizophrenia. It is not the
inputs from sub-cortical neuromodulatory systems that convey
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that content, even though they do have modulatory effects on the
intra-cortical interactions that do. Furthermore, there is ample
evidence that impairments of the glutamatergic and GABAergic
systems are central to schizophrenia.
Previous papers have distinguished gain-control from
dynamic Gestalt grouping or “integration” (e.g., Butler et al.,
2008), but here we use the phrase context-sensitive gain-control
to cover both, because grouping can be seen as a form of context-
sensitive gain-control on a fast time-scale that may use essentially
the same mechanisms as other coordinating interactions (Phillips
et al., 2010). The close relations between grouping and other
forms of gain-control are clear in the similar dependence of
contour integration and flanker facilitation on collinearity.
Furthermore, there is clear evidence for deficits in both contour
integration (Silverstein et al., 2009) and flanker facilitation (Must
et al., 2004) in schizophrenia.
As context-sensitivity is central to our hypotheses we must
also make clear what we mean by “context.” Some influential
researchers identify “context” with information about time and
place, or with information in working memory (WM) (e.g.,
Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Gonzalez-Burgos and Lewis,
2008; Lewis, 2012). From our perspective those conceptions are
far too narrow. Instead, we define context as any information that
is used to modulate the strength with which a pyramidal cell,
or local cortical circuit, transmits the information to which it is
selectively sensitive. Thus, inputs arising from concurrent sensory
input (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2007), as well as those arising from
many other ongoing activities, can also control gain.
We do not provide a comprehensive review of the vast amount
of empirical and theoretical research relevant to all the issues dis-
cussed in this paper. Our goal is to cite representative examples
of the relevant findings. The perspective taken here overlaps in
various ways and to various extents with several other theories.
We do not claim priority for any of its essential components. One
previous theory that we should relate it to, however, is our own.
The central hypotheses examined are similar to those that we pro-
posed ten years ago (Phillips and Silverstein, 2003), except that we
now emphasize a greater variety of possible functions and mech-
anisms. Then we emphasized contextual disambiguation, now we
emphasize various other possible functions. Then we emphasized
NMDA receptors (NMDARs) for glutamate (the main excita-
tory neurotransmitter in cortex) as the main mechanism for
gain-control. Now we emphasize several other possibilities also,
including various classes of inhibitory interneuron and various
intracellular mechanisms.
Thus, motivated by the above considerations, we examine
five central hypotheses in this paper. First, context-sensitive
gain-control is fundamental to brain function and mental life.
Second, it occurs in many different regions of the cerebral cor-
tex of many different mammalian species. Third, it has several
computational functions, each with wide generality. Fourth, it
is implemented by various mechanisms at cellular and circuit
levels. Fifth, impairments of context-sensitive gain-control pro-
duce many of the well-known symptoms of schizophrenia and
change basic processes of visual perception. To the extent that
schizophrenia arises from widespread impairments of context-
sensitive gain-control, insights gained from studying it can also
inform our basic understanding of brain function and mental life
in general.
These hypotheses are guided by various theoretical attitudes
and working assumptions. First, our perspective is resolutely
multi-disciplinary. Second, we assume that there are two-way
causal interactions between macroscopic events at a psycholog-
ical level and microscopic events at a cellular level. Third, we
assume that impairments at synaptic and local circuit levels may
be subtle, such as those related to differences between subtypes of
cortical neuron or synaptic receptor. For example, there are vari-
ous subtypes of NMDAR with the 2A and 2B subtypes being the
most common in cerebral cortex. Small parametric differences in
their biophysical properties suggest that the 2A subtype is better
suited to operate on signals with high temporal precision. In addi-
tion, there is evidence that adolescence is associated with dramatic
changes in NMDAR distribution (Wang and Gao, 2009), includ-
ing a switch from the 2B to the 2A subtype (Liu et al., 2004). This
suggests that disorders with an adolescent onset, as is the case
with psychosis in schizophrenia, might be related to such subtle
differences.
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sections.
Section Context-Sensitive Gain-Control Plays a Central Role in
Brain Function and Mental Life outlines our theory of context-
sensitive gain-control, and reviews evidence concerning its role
in normal cognition and brain function. Central aims of this
section are to clarify our understanding of both its functions
and its mechanisms. Section The Functions and Mechanisms of
Context-Sensitive Gain-Control are Impaired in Schizophrenia
reviews evidence that both the functions and the mechanisms are
impaired in schizophrenia. Section Difficulties for the Hypotheses
Proposed and Major Aspects to be Further Developed outlines
some difficulties faced by the theory, and suggests ways in which
it can be further tested and developed.
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL PLAYS A CENTRAL
ROLE IN BRAIN FUNCTION ANDMENTAL LIFE
Contextual inputs to a local neural processor that arise from other
ongoing activity in the system are in effect implicit predictions
about the current state of the activity of that local processor.
Mental life as a whole would be fully coherent if all local activ-
ities were as predicted by other ongoing activity. Though that
state is an unrealistic ideal, we do depend on our ability to make
sufficiently accurate inferences about distal things from proximal
signals, about our ownmental activities and intentions, and about
the likely consequences of possible actions.
The centrality of unconscious inference to perception was
emphasized by Helmholtz more than a 100 years ago. This per-
spective has now been extended into several prominent theories
of cognition and brain function that are often referred to col-
lectively as the “Bayesian brain” (e.g., Feldman, 2001; Purves
et al., 2001; Körding andWolpert, 2004; Yuille and Kersten, 2006;
Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2010; Brown and Friston,
2012). The central tenet of these theories is that interpretation
of sensory input depends upon the beliefs about the world that
have been acquired from prior experience. Many psychophysical,
neurobiological, and computational studies support this perspec-
tive (Clark, 2013). These theories usually imply a central role for
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context-sensitive gain-control, and they provide the basis for sev-
eral recent and influential theories of schizophrenia (e.g., Friston,
2005; Corlett et al., 2007, 2010; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Synofzik
et al., 2010; Seth et al., 2011).
Our theory agrees with these main-stream theories in empha-
sizing probabilistic inference, but it differs in important ways.
First, instead of relying primarily on “Bayes theorem,” we build on
the foundations laid by the American statistical physicist Jaynes
(2003). The many riches in Jaynes’s analysis have been ignored by
most neuroscientists and psychologists, but one notable exception
is the neurophysiologist Fiorillo (2012) who sees the implications
of Jaynes’s logic as requiring radical changes in the current con-
sensus concerning the “Bayesian brain.” We agree. The relevance
of Jaynes’s work to our perspective has therefore been exam-
ined in depth elsewhere (Phillips, 2012). Second, we assume that
the requirements for optimal inference can rarely be fully met.
For example, between what options must higher cortical regions
choose when perceiving things? What prior data are relevant? On
what should likelihoods be conditioned? These are not questions
to which we expect optimal answers, even though, given answers
to them, the principles of Jaynes’s logic specify the optimal way to
draw inferences from them. Third, context operates via the likeli-
hoods, not via the prior probability, as shown formally by Kay and
Phillips (2010). Fourth, we are not committed to the view that
prediction error is the common currency of feed-forward signals
between cortical regions as proposed by Rao and Ballard (1999).
Instead, we assume that what is fed-forward from any level to the
next is information about the current interpretations or predic-
tions as inferred at that level. Fifth, inferences depend on con-
textual predictions, and hierarchical Bayesian theories emphasize
feed-back signals from higher regions as the source of the pre-
dictions. We also emphasize predictions from lateral contextual
interactions both within and between cortical regions, however,
and this applies to all levels of the system as clearly demonstrated
by the ubiquitous distribution of the mechanisms by which con-
textual interactions are implemented. All this is fully compatible
with amplification of attended signals (Spratling, 2008; Spratling
et al., 2009), and also with amplification of feed-forward signals
that contradict strong predictions.
Our previous claims concerning the role of context-sensitive
gain-control in cognitive coordination (Phillips and Silverstein,
2003) have been rigorously formalized using information the-
oretic concepts (e.g., Kay et al., 1998; Kay and Phillips, 2010),
and are founded on cognitive, neurobiological, and clinical evi-
dence, including that from visual psychophysics. The ubiquity of
local ambiguity in visual perception and its resolution by con-
text is well-established by many reviews of neurobiological and
psychophysical studies (e.g., Phillips and Singer, 1997; Phillips
and Silverstein, 2003; Butler et al., 2008; von der Malsburg et al.,
2010). This applies to the early stages of visual processing, and
also to the higher levels of perceptual interpretation, such as
in the dependence of object recognition on scene context (Bar,
2004). Taking these well-established findings as a given, the per-
spective outlined here formalizes conceptions of context-sensitive
gain-control rigorously in terms of computations that neural sys-
tems can perform, and relates them to detailed neurobiological
mechanisms at both intracellular and local-circuit levels. These
computations are described in formal terms to show that they
can in principle deliver the capabilities claimed for them, and that
they have sufficient generality to underlie many different domains
of cognition.
Several prominent theorists have previously argued that gain
modulation is a major computational principle underlying brain
function (e.g., Salinas and Their, 2000; Salinas and Sejnowski,
2001; Chance et al., 2002), and some of its many computational
functions will be listed in sub-section Context-Sensitive Gain-
Control has Several Computational Functions. Within computa-
tional neuroscience gain modulation, or gain-control, is usually
defined as a non-linear change in the response amplitude of a
neuron that does not change its receptive field (RF) selectivity,
i.e., its tuning function. Mathematically this has general utility
because a population of responses to any RF variable, x, mod-
ulated by any context, y provides a basis set from which any
function of x and y can be computed, and in many relevant cases
it can be computed simply as a linear weighted sum (Salinas
and Their, 2000; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001). Salinas and Their
(2000) note that to some researchers it can seem difficult to draw
the line between selectivity and modulation, however, and that
would greatly weaken any theory using it as a fundamental dis-
tinction. Fortunately, this crucial distinction is clear to others,
such as Lamme (2004) whose extensive electrophysiological find-
ings on contextual modulation led him to the conclusion that
it bears no relation to the neuron’s RF properties and is medi-
ated by mechanisms far removed from those that shape and
tune the local RF. Furthermore, the distinction can be rigor-
ously formulated using information theoretic concepts (Smyth
et al., 1996). Primary driving RF input is that determining the
variables and values to which the neuron is selectively tuned,
and about which it thus transmits information. Gain-control
changes the rate at which the neuron’s output increases with the
strength of the driving inputs to which it is selectively tuned,
but without fundamentally changing that selectivity. In short,
selective driving inputs are both necessary and sufficient to pro-
duce an output signal; contextual inputs are neither necessary nor
sufficient.
NEUROBIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE THAT CONTEXT-SENSITIVE
GAIN-CONTROL OCCURS IN MANY DIFFERENT CORTICAL REGIONS
There is ample evidence that context-sensitive gain-control
occurs within the mammalian brain. Its wide distribution
throughout the cortex is shown by evidence from single units,
multiple units, local-field potentials, intra-cortical potentials, and
macroscopic neuroimaging [see reviews by Phillips and Singer
(1997); Phillips and Silverstein (2003); Lamme (2004); Schwartz
et al. (2007); Salinas (2009); Lee and Sherman (2010); Feldman
and Friston (2010); von der Malsburg et al. (2010)]. Studies using
recent and revolutionary optogenetic techniques to control the
activity of cortical cells also show that context-sensitive gain-
control occurs in various cortical regions. They also provide clear
evidence on the mechanisms by which gain-control is achieved,
and so are reviewed in sub-section There are Various Local-
Circuit and Cellular Mechanisms for Context-Sensitive Gain-
Control where possible mechanisms are discussed. In addition to
all the physiological evidence, common anatomical features of the
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canonical cortical circuit also suggest that gain-control is a gen-
eral principle of cortical computation (Douglas andMartin, 2007,
2008).
Interpretation of these electrophysiological and anatomical
findings has been strengthened by many computational stud-
ies of the role of context-sensitivity and gain-control in per-
ceptual and higher cognitive functions. Examples include stud-
ies by Huang and Grossberg (2010) in learning and visual
search, and many others reviewed by Schwartz et al. (2007)
in relation to the perception of orientation. Context-sensitive
gain-control is central to the computational model by which
Schwartz et al. (2009) account for dynamic Gestalt grouping,
the effects of context, and their dependence on natural scene
statistics, all of which have been observed in visual cortex.
Their model uses normalization in the form of divisive gain-
control, and they argue that it is relevant to various levels
of the visual system. Furthermore, contextual disambiguation
and the dynamic grouping of coherently related elements may
be of even greater importance to higher cognitive functions,
such as language. Our working assumption is therefore that,
as argued by Phillips and Singer (1997), context-sensitive gain-
control provides a common foundation for cortical computation
in general.
Evidence for a form of gain modulation that combines retinal
and gaze signals multiplicatively was first observed in single-
unit recordings in neurons of the parietal cortex of the macaque
monkey, and computational studies showed that it could pro-
vide a basis for converting the position of stimuli relative to
the retina into position relative to the head (Andersen et al.,
1985). Since then several other coordinate transformations that
could also be based on multiplicative gain modulation have been
seen in other cortical areas (e.g., Galletti and Battaglini, 1989;
Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001). This is widely assumed to be yet
another form of context-sensitive gain-control, and that assump-
tion will be reconsidered after our review of schizophrenia-related
impairments because they cast new light on it.
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL HAS SEVERAL COMPUTATIONAL
FUNCTIONS
Context-sensitive gain-control has several computational func-
tions; each with wide generality. Here we simply list some of the
most well-known, making no attempt to review the substantial
body of research available on each.
First, contextual disambiguation is one of its main functions.
This could be achieved by multiplicatively increasing the gain
on interpretations that are coherently related to the context and
reducing the gain on those that are not. Examples of this include
the enhancement of low-contrast edge detection by collinear
flankers (Polat and Sagi, 1993), sensitivity of object recogni-
tion to scene context (Bar, 2004), word-sense disambiguation,
and many other examples. Our broad conception of contex-
tual disambiguation includes coordination of multiple distinct
probabilistic decisions so that they form a coherent whole. An
example of this at the level of object perception is the interpre-
tation of ambiguous figures, such as the duck-rabbit figure or
Necker cube.When perception switches between alternative inter-
pretations it does so as a whole, implying that all the distinct
decisions that this involves are coordinated by some form of
context-sensitive gain-control that operates so as to maximize
coherence over the whole figure that is being interpreted (Klemm
et al., 2000).
Second, divisive normalization is another function of gain-
control that has been described as a canonical computation.
This has various uses from low levels of sensory processing to
high levels of cognition such as value encoding (Carandini and
Heeger, 2012). It includes surround suppression (Heeger, 1992;
Simoncelli and Schwartz, 1999), invariant object recognition
(Kouh and Poggio, 2008), the reduction of redundancy (Schwartz
and Simoncelli, 2001), and various other ways of producing effi-
cient codes. Recent neurophysiological findings show that input
normalization by feedforward inhibition can expand the dynamic
range of cortical activities by enabling populations of pyrami-
dal cells to remain sensitive to weak inputs without saturating
in response to stronger inputs (Pouille et al., 2009). Within the
theory of Coherent Infomax, which provides the foundations on
which our current hypotheses are built, the driving RF is equiv-
alent to the driving summation field in normalization theory.
The suppressive field in normalization theory is included within
the contextual field (CF) that is an essential component of the
Coherent Infomax theory. For an outline and peer-evaluation of
that theory see Phillips and Singer (1997); for an outline and eval-
uation of its relevance to schizophrenia see Phillips and Silverstein
(2003).
Third, context-sensitive gain-control can also play a role in
dynamic Gestalt grouping. Grouping, sometimes referred to as
“integration,” can be treated as a separate class of functions quite
distinct from gain-control (e.g., Butler et al., 2008), but here
we include it within a broad conception of gain-control for the
reasons noted in section Introduction. Lamme (2004), who has
studied contextual modulation extensively, argues that percep-
tual grouping is one of its main functions. Furthermore, there
is much evidence that gain-control on a fast time-scale so as to
synchronize coherent subsets could provide the basis for many
cognitive functions including Gestalt figural organization (von
derMalsburg et al., 2010). Finally, as we will show below, dynamic
Gestalt grouping depends upon some of the same mechanisms as
other forms of context-sensitive gain-control, such as fast-spiking
inhibitory interneurons.
Fourth, context-sensitivity contributes to object and face
recognition because the probability of seeing any given object or
face depends so strongly upon the context (Bar, 2004). It may also
contribute to the invariance of object recognition because nor-
malization can be used to compute outputs that are insensitive to
irrelevant stimulus dimensions (Salinas, 2009).
Fifth, selective attention also requires gain-control because it
enhances the selected signals and suppresses the irrelevant sig-
nals. We therefore assume that the context that controls gain
includes attention, which is in harmony with both the biased-
competition theory (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), and its recent
re-interpretation as a form of divisive normalization (Reynolds
and Heeger, 2009).
Sixth, context-sensitive gain-control can produce efficient
codes by using predictions to suppress the feed-forward transmis-
sion of signals that are highly probable, and thus not informative.
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Predictions are often assumed to be computed using hierarchi-
cal Bayesian inference (e.g., Lee and Mumford, 2003), and that
possibility has now been developed into several highly influen-
tial theories. It may seem that such predictive coding theories are
in conflict with the biased-competition theory of selective atten-
tion because they imply the suppression of predicted data, rather
than its enhancement. It has been shown computationally that
predictive coding and biased-competition are in principle com-
patible, however. This was done by combining them in a single
model in which prediction-error processing occurs within, rather
than between, cortical regions. Selective attention can then mod-
ulate those signals, so as to enhance, rather than suppress, the
selected interpretations (Spratling, 2008; Spratling et al., 2009).
Recent developments of that model show that by combining both
driving and modulating inputs to the local processors it can
account in detail for many well-established neurophysiological
and psychophysical phenomena, including surround suppression,
contour integration, predictive coding, and selective attention
(Spratling, submitted).
Seventh, a neural network model has shown that contextual
modulation can be used to select one of a number of possible
arbitrary mappings from sensory stimuli to motor actions by
controlling gain, thus helping to explain how higher organisms
can rapidly and flexibly adapt their actions to current condi-
tions (Salinas, 2004). Though that model is concerned with the
selection of motor commands, the same computations could
apply equally well to the selection of inner percepts and thoughts
as assumed by the closely related theory of Coherent Infomax.
Though these two theories were developed independently, they
use essentially the samemathematical function to specify how the
gain of the response to driving inputs is modulated by the con-
text. Both theories are strengthened by this convergence because
each provides further grounds for supporting the other.
Finally, another possible function is coordinate transforma-
tion, which was one of the first uses of gain modulation for which
there was both empirical and theoretical evidence. This has been
widely assumed to be a paradigmatic example of gain-control in
general (e.g., Salinas, 2009), but the validity of that assumption
remains to be determined.
It may also be possible to relate these basic computational
functions of context-sensitive gain-control to more subjective
aspects of human conscious experience. One recent development
suggesting how that might be done is a theory of interoceptive
inference which offers a unified account of emotion, the sense
of presence, and the sense of agency (Seth et al., 2011), all of
which are impaired in schizophrenia (e.g., Hauser et al., 2011)
and can be impaired by drugs that block (modulatory) activity
at NMDARs (e.g., Moore et al., 2013). By analogy with predic-
tive coding theories of visual perception, interoceptive inference
is hypothesized to involve a hierarchy of top-down predictions
that guide the interpretation of bottom-up interoceptive signals.
The subjective sense of the reality of the self and of the exter-
nal world, referred to as conscious “presence,” is hypothesized
to depend on the successful suppression of interoceptive signals
by precise top-down predictions (Seth et al., 2011). Similarly, the
subjective sense of agency is hypothesized to arise from precise
predictions of the sensory consequences of actions, as proposed
by Fletcher and Frith (2009). The theory of (Seth et al., 2011)
synthesizes much of the relevant phenomenology, neurobiology,
and psychopathology, and the precision of prediction error sig-
nals plays a key role in their theory. This is optimized by using
context to control the gain of prediction error units. Seth et al.
emphasize the role of the classic neuromodulators in doing this,
and dopamine in particular, but more locally-specific coordinat-
ing interactions must also play a role. Their theory is particularly
relevant here because it depends on the modulation of precision
by gain-control, and explicitly shows how impaired gain-control
could produce positive symptoms of psychosis. It is impor-
tant to note that although Seth et al. emphasize feed-forward
transmission of prediction-errors, rather than of the inferences
used to make the predictions, that is not essential to predic-
tive inference as explained in our above discussion of predictive
coding.
THERE ARE VARIOUS LOCAL-CIRCUIT AND CELLULAR MECHANISMS
FOR CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL
There are various mechanisms for controlling gain within the
cortex (e.g., Salinas, 2009; Silver, 2010). There is no simple
one-to-one mapping between these mechanisms and the various
functions of gain-control because onemechanismmay contribute
to more than one function and one function may be performed
by more than one mechanism. Different mechanisms are suited
to different roles, however, because they collect contextual infor-
mation from very different sources, operate on very different
time-scales, and vary greatly in the distribution of their effects,
with some exerting gain-control that is highly local while others
have widely distributed effects.
The simplest way in which pyramidal cells could increase the
gain of other pyramidal cells so as to amplify coherent activ-
ities is via direct connections between them. It is likely that
such a mechanism is used because it is the fastest and most
energy efficient. In addition, it requires the transmission of a
great deal of information and about 75% of all cortical connec-
tions are between pyramidal cells (Braitenberg and Schuz, 1991).
Furthermore, NMDARs, which provide the means by which such
connections can control gain (Phillips and Silverstein, 2003), are
highly expressed on pyramidal cells. Recurrent excitation medi-
ated by NMDARs also contributes to sustained neuronal firing,
which is a potential substrate for WM (Gonzalez-Burgos and
Lewis, 2008). Finally, a crucial role for direct gain-controlling
interactions between pyramidal cells is shown by Self et al. (2012)
using the well-established phenomenon of figure-ground modu-
lation. This was almost abolished when NMDARs were blocked
in V1, whereas the purely feedforward component of pyramidal
cell response was largely unaffected. Conversely, blocking AMPA
receptors did not affect figure-groundmodulation, but did greatly
reduce the feedforward component. Direct NMDAR-mediated
interactions between pyramidal cells are therefore likely to be
a widely used mechanism for controlling gain so as to amplify
coherently related activities.
Recurrent connection between pyramidal cells requires tight
inhibitory control to prevent runaway excitation, however, and
this is provided by inhibitory interneurons. Much is now known
about their role in shaping cortical activity (Isaacson and
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 307 | 5
Phillips and Silverstein Context-sensitive gain-control
Scanziani, 2010), and they play a central role in various gain-
control mechanisms. This is easy to understand intuitively: as
inhibitory mechanisms for suppressing activity must be present
it is likely that evolution has used them to control gain. It
has recently been shown that this is so by combining advanced
transgenic and optogenetic techniques with classical recording
methods. Using optogenetic techniques experimenters can con-
trol the activity of genetically specified subtypes of cortical
neuron in specified cortical layers of awake behaving animals,
and they can do so with millimeter and millisecond precision.
Studies using these techniques show that different classes of
inhibitory interneuron provide mechanisms for different forms
of context-sensitive gain-control. One major class, referred to
as PV interneurons, are those expressing parvalbumin (PV), a
low-weight protein involved in various physiological processes,
including neuronal signaling. They have been identified with
chandelier and basket cells, which are fast-spiking local-circuit
inhibitory interneurons with synapses on perisomatic parts of
pyramidal cells. Optogenetic studies show that under natural con-
ditions PV interneurons can either amplify or suppress the gain
of pyramidal cell activity (Atallah et al., 2012). They show that PV
interneurons control the gain of the response of layer 2/3 pyrami-
dal cells in an essentially simple way. Optogenetically suppressing
PV interneuron activity increased layer 2/3 pyramidal cell activity
multiplicatively by a factor of 1.2 and added a constant amount.
Optogenetically activating PV interneurons decreased pyramidal
cell activity divisively by a factor of 1.4 and subtracted a con-
stant amount (Atallah et al., 2012). Furthermore, small changes in
PV interneuron-mediated inhibition can lead to robust changes
in the gain of pyramidal cell response without having any major
impact on the selectivity of their tuning (Atallah et al., 2012). This
provides direct and independent support for theories proposing
that cortical computation is founded on the ability to control gain
without fundamentally changing selectivity (Phillips and Singer,
1997; Kay et al., 1998; Phillips and Silverstein, 2003; Kay and
Phillips, 2010).
Given that PV interneurons control gain, we need to con-
sider the source of their inputs. One likely possibility is that this
includes input from layer six cells in the same cortical column.
Other optogenetic studies have revealed that excitatory cells in
layer six of visual cortex control the gain of visually evoked activ-
ity in pyramidal neurons in the higher layers of the same cortical
column (Olsen et al., 2012). This establishes pyramidal cells in
layer six as a major mediator of cortical gain-control, so a major
task for the future is to discover more about their inputs.
In addition to the PV-expressing class of inhibitory interneu-
ron there is another large class, including Martinotti cells, which
express the neuropeptide somatostatin (SOM interneurons).
They are not fast-spiking and have axonal arbors on the distal
dendrites of pyramidal cells. They are widely distributed across
mammalian cortex, including that of humans, and are involved in
the regulation of various processes. Of particular relevance here
is their role in visual gain-control. By selectively reducing SOM
interneuron activity using optogenetic techniques, it has been
shown that they contribute to surround suppression (Adesnik
et al., 2012). Reducing their activity significantly reduced sur-
round suppression of layer 2/3 neurons by between 10 and 30%.
SOM interneurons are but one of several mechanisms for sur-
round suppression, however, as it is also in part inherited from
earlier stages of visual processing, and is also in part due to
other types of inhibitory interneuron and circuit mechanisms
(Adesnik et al., 2012). A plausible default assumption is that visual
surround-suppression by divisive normalization is but one exam-
ple of a general computational strategy for suppressing highly
probable signals, thus making less probable signals more salient
(Seriès et al., 2003; Carandini and Heeger, 2012).
At the intracellular level there are several mechanisms by
which gain-control can be implemented. These include shunt-
ing inhibition, background noise induced by balanced excitatory
and inhibitory input, nonlinear dendritic integration such as
dendritically localized NMDAR-mediated spikes, and short-term
depression (STD) which can provide a mechanism for multi-
plicative gain-control if the contextual inputs are received on
synapses distant from the cell body (Silver, 2010). Two mecha-
nisms may be of particular relevance to the general computational
issues considered here, as well as to schizophrenia (see below).
One involves PV interneurons because they have the ability to
amplify or suppress pyramidal cell activity. They also modulate
temporal precision and generate synchronized gamma rhythms.
They do this by controlling the “window-of-opportunity” within
which pyramidal cells can generate spikes given their driving
inputs (Gonzalez-Burgos and Lewis, 2008; Phillips et al., 2010).
Computational modeling shows that by synchronizing the local
activity of PV interneurons to a greater or lesser degree this win-
dow can be opened more or less. This is because PV neurons
exert a powerful veto on spiking, so synchronizing their bursts
also synchronizes the periods between bursts. This synchronized
disinhibition therefore provides a “window of opportunity” for
spiking that could provide a means by which contextual inputs,
such as those from selective attention, could control the gain
of pyramidal cell responses to their driving inputs (Tiesinga
et al., 2008). It is known that in rodent primary somatosen-
sory cortex their excitatory inputs are on distal dendrites, and
come from both thalamic and intracortical sources, whereas
their inhibitory inputs are somatic and perisomatic (Kameda
et al., 2012), but we now need to know far more about those
sources.
Another mechanism that may be of particular relevance is
modulation of proximally driven activity by distal nonlinear
dendritic currents, because that can either increase or decrease
response gain at the soma (Silver, 2010). The possibility that
distal dendritic tuft inputs might modulate response gain to
inputs at the soma and basal dendrites was explored computa-
tionally by Körding and König (2000). They showed that this
enables the learning and processing of information that is rele-
vant to the context. Lee and Sherman (2010) distinguished two
classes of glutamatergic pathways in the auditory cortex, termed
“drivers” and “modulators.” Driving inputs are the information-
bearing pathways, while modulators regulate transmission of the
driving information. Driving inputs are received by proximal den-
drites, whereasmodulatory inputs are received by distal dendrites.
Lee and Sherman (2010) also note that these two glutamater-
gic pathways are fundamentally different in other ways. Driving
inputs are received from thick axons at ionotropic synapses, and
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produce large EPSPs via depressing synapses and dense synap-
tic arbors. Modulatory inputs are received from thin axons at
ionotropic and metabotropic synapses, and they produce small
EPSPs via facilitating synapses and sparse synaptic arbors. All
these differences are in agreement with the distinction between
driving inputs and context-sensitive gain-control on which our
hypotheses here are based. Lee and Sherman (2010) argue that
their distinction between drivers and modulators clarifies the
function of the many parallel and descending pathways in the
auditory and other sensory pathways. We agree, and argue for the
potential relevance of such a distinction to cortical processing in
general. Further support for the view that some contextual influ-
ences operate via thin distal dendrites is that the cortico-cortical
projections that are likely to convey them terminate preferen-
tially in superficial cortical layers and on the distal segments of
apical dendrites of pyramidal cells, which are especially rich in
NMDARs (Monaghan and Cotman, 1985; Rosier et al., 1993).
We do not suggest that all contextual influences operate via dis-
tal dendrites, however. Inhibitory modulatory influences from PV
cells are received on or proximal to the soma, so they do not oper-
ate via distal synapses. Furthermore, other mechanisms that are
both modulatory and proximal may yet be discovered. A simple
summary of the current evidence is that direct modulatory inter-
actions between pyramidal cells seem to be predominantly distal,
as does modulation by inhibitory SOM interneurons, whereas
modulation by inhibitory PV interneurons is proximal to or on
the soma.
Though much remains to be learned about the functions
andmechanisms of context-sensitive gain-control, one important
conclusion is already clear. It is not a single function with a sin-
gle mechanism. It is a family of regulatory functions served by a
variety of mechanisms, and with complex interactions between
them; there is no need for evolution to produce only mechanisms
that are easy for us to understand. The inhibitory interneu-
ron activity that produces changes in pyramidal cell gain can
itself be modulated by NMDAR-mediated input to the inhibitory
interneurons. Thus pyramidal cells modulate each others’ activ-
ities directly via NMDAR-mediated connections, and indirectly
via their effects on the modulation produced by inhibitory
interneuron activity. The different mechanisms nevertheless make
different contributions as they are suited to different functions.
It is going to be difficult to find out exactly which mechanisms
do what because their capabilities depend on so many things
(Silver, 2010). These include: (1) whether it is input or output
gain that is modulated; (2) the morphological complexity of the
cell whose activity is modulated; (3) whether the modulatory
inputs are proximal to the soma or on distal apical dendrites;
(4) whether the modulatory synapses are clustered or widely
distributed; (5) whether the gain is to be increased multiplica-
tively or decreased divisively; (6) the time-scale over which gain
is modulated; and (7) whether it operates on sustained high-
frequency rate signals or on sparse and brief but temporally
correlated population signals. Therefore, a major task for the cog-
nitive neuroscience of the future is find out which of the various
mechanisms for context-sensitive gain-control contribute to each
of its various uses. This is a difficult task, but it may be greatly
facilitated by studying disorders, such as schizophrenia, in which
functions and mechanisms of context-sensitive gain-control are
both impaired.
THE FUNCTIONS ANDMECHANISMS OF
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL ARE IMPAIRED IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Here we discuss visual and other impairments in schizophrenia
in the light of the functions and mechanisms of context-sensitive
gain-control reviewed above. As our focus is on impairments of
basic capabilities common to many different cognitive domains
and cortical regions, we are not constrained to consider only
impairments that are specific to perception. We do need to
ask whether or not they are specific to context-sensitive gain-
control, however. The evidence suggests that schizophrenia-
related impairments are rarely all-or-none, so our default working
assumption is that the capabilities impaired are still operating to
some extent, though less effectively.
IMPAIRMENTS OF VISUAL PERCEPTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA INVOLVE
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL
Many studies show that impairments of visual perception
in schizophrenia involve reduced context-sensitivity and gain-
control. There is no need for a comprehensive review of all these
impairments here because they will be the focus of other papers
within this Frontiers Research Topic. Here it is sufficient to com-
ment on recent assessments of this issue (Butler et al., 2008, 2012;
Green et al., 2009), and to outline a few further findings.
Butler et al. (2008) divide the visual functions that are
impaired in schizophrenic disorders into two groups, “gain con-
trol” and “integration.” They define gain control as processes
optimizing response to stimuli within a particular surrounding
context. One form of this is that in which the neurons’ dynamic
range is modulated so as to increase responses to differences
between adjacent and successive stimuli, as seen, for example, in
“pop-out” and “surround suppression” paradigms. Divisive gain
normalization is the appropriate form of gain-control in that case,
and center-surround suppression has been shown to be reduced
in schizophrenia (Dakin et al., 2005; Yoon et al., 2009). Another
form of gain control (Butler et al., 2008) is the amplification of
driving inputs that are present but weak such as those produced
by near-threshold stimuli, as shown, for example, by facilitation
of the detection of a low-contrast edge by collinear flankers. This
form of gain-control can be studied in various psychophysical and
electrophysiological paradigms that measure contrast-sensitivity
under conditions designed to reveal the operation of either the
magnocellular or parvocellular visual pathway, and with either
transient, moving, or steady-state stimulation. In general these
paradigms include any in which the preceding, concurrent, or
following context amplifies signals coherently related to that con-
text. Multiplicative gain amplification is appropriate for this form
of gain-control. It is clearly impaired in schizophrenia but not in
other forms of seriousmental illness (Butler et al., 2005; Kéri et al.,
2005a,b, 2009). Impairmentmay be greater inmagnocellular than
in parvocellular pathways (Butler et al., 2005, 2008).
Butler et al. (2008) define “integration” as the process link-
ing the output of neurons into globally coherent subsets, where
their individual activities are assumed to code for local attributes.
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This is therefore equivalent to what is here and elsewhere referred
to as dynamic Gestalt grouping. There are many paradigms for
studying such grouping, with contour integration being an exam-
ple that is often used because it can be rigorously controlled.
Since 1961, many of these paradigms have been used to study
visual grouping in schizophrenia (Snyder, 1961; Snyder et al.,
1961), with the general conclusion being that it is impaired, as
reviewed by Silverstein and Keane (2011). Impaired grouping in
schizophrenia has been demonstrated in studies of perceptual
organization of static forms, fragmented forms, completion of
occluded objects, illusory correlations, and coherent motion. This
evidence includes psychophysical, electrophysiological, and brain
imaging data (e.g., Spencer et al., 2003; Silverstein et al., 2009;
Sehatpour et al., 2010; Chen, 2011).
It is well-established that face processing is impaired in
schizophrenia (e.g., Uhlhaas et al., 2006a; Turetsky et al., 2007;
Silverstein et al., 2010; Soria Bauser et al., 2012), including
changes in the perception of emotion (e.g., McBain et al., 2010),
which can contribute much to disordered interpersonal interac-
tions. As perceptual deficits are not confined to higher levels of
processing, deficits at lower levels may account for some of the
face processing impairments (Turetsky et al., 2007; McBain et al.,
2010; Silverstein et al., 2010). Schizophrenia patients need more
visual information and use it atypically (Lee et al., 2011), with
configural or holistic processing being particularly impaired (Shin
et al., 2008; Joshua and Rossell, 2009). All these findings harmo-
nize well with the hypotheses we propose. Impairments in face
perception are also observed in body dysmorphic disorder, the
only other psychiatric condition in which perceptual organiza-
tion impairments have been observed (Feusner et al., 2007, 2010),
and where half of the patient population also exhibits delusional
psychotic symptoms (Phillips et al., 2006).
Schizophrenia-related deficits have been shown to be specific
to context-sensitive gain-control in experiments that use con-
ditions in which context is misleading. If performance deficits
are specifically due to reduced effects of context then perfor-
mance may be supra-normal when context is misleading. This
was shown to be the case in a size perception taskwhere surround-
ing figures provided a context that was helpful in some conditions
and misleading in others (Silverstein et al., 1996; Uhlhaas et al.,
2006b). Schizophrenia patients in those studies were neither
helped by helpful context nor hindered by misleading context.
Similar results were reported by Dakin et al. (2005) who found
that schizophrenia patients had decreased center-surround antag-
onism in a contrast perception task. High-contrast surrounds
reduced perceived contrast of the central target in control sub-
jects but not for most of the patients, with the consequence
that patient’s judgments were then more veridical than normal.
Finally, Tadin et al. (2006) found that schizophrenia patients had
reduced surround suppression in a motion perception paradigm,
including more veridical performance in conditions where con-
text was misleading.
Figure-ground segregation using brief temporal cues is also
severely impaired in many but not all schizophrenia patients
(Hancock et al., 2008). This was demonstrated in a task based
on figure-ground segregation by onset-asynchrony. Performance
in this task is likely to be particularly sensitive to the function
of magnocellular pathways because it is concerned with rapid
attentional capture, at low spatial resolution, of overall stimulus
organization. Most people can segregate figure from groundwhen
the asynchrony of their onsets is about 24ms, but 7 of 9 chroni-
cally disorganized schizophrenia patients required asynchronies
of at least 50–100ms. (Hancock et al., 2008). Furthermore, 7 of
63 undergraduate students also showed poor temporal resolu-
tion in this task, four of whom had schizotypy disorganization
scores well into the clinical range, suggesting that this psy-
chophysical paradigm may provide a useful endophentoype for
the disorder.
Eight possible uses for context-sensitive gain-control were
listed in sub-section Context-Sensitive Gain-Control has Several
Computational Functions. So far we have cited evidence that
four are impaired in schizophrenia. What of the other four,
i.e., selective attention, modulation of precision in probabilis-
tic inference, arbitrary input-output mappings, and coordinate
transformation? All are relevant to vision, though none to vision
alone. Selective attention is clearly one of the major impair-
ments in schizophrenia, and is related to positive symptoms (e.g.,
Cornblatt et al., 1985). Imprecise signaling in probabilistic infer-
ence may also make a major contribution to positive symptoms
(e.g., Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Seth et al., 2011), as discussed fur-
ther below. The use of context to guide selection of one from a
number of possible mappings is also likely to be impaired, though
we know of no work explicitly relating that to the model of Salinas
(2004).
Finally, although it is often emphasized as a paradigmatic
example of gain modulation in general (Salinas and Their, 2000;
Salinas, 2009), coordinate transformation seems the least likely
to be impaired in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia patients show no
signs of disordered gaze or reaching, or of inadequate coordi-
nate transformation in any other domain. Schizophrenia patients
do demonstrate heightened spatial frame illusions, and this may
suggest abnormalities in visuo-motor functioning (Chen et al.,
2011). Schizophrenia patients do not demonstrate the normal
degree of attenuation of sensory feedback during self-initiated
movements, and this has been proposed as a factor in the for-
mation of delusions of control by external entities (Landgraf
et al., 2012). Similarly, schizophrenia patients do show height-
ened susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion, suggesting a
more dynamic and flexible representation of their body in space
(Thakkar et al., 2011). None of these findings suggest primary
impairments in coordinate transformation, however. Maybe there
are none. The obvious prediction from our theory is that coordi-
nate transformation will only be impaired to the extent that it
depends upon the same neuronal mechanisms as the forms of
context-sensitive gain-control that are impaired. As many forms
of context-sensitive gain-control are impaired but coordinate
transformation seems not to be, this raises the possibility that,
instead of being a paradigmatic example of gain-control in gen-
eral, it is somehow quite different. Further thought on this issue
reveals that neither of the two classes of input on which coor-
dinate transformation depends meet our long-used criteria for
classifying an input as “context,” because, according to our def-
initions, contextual inputs are neither necessary nor sufficient,
whereas in coordinate transformation both classes of input that
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it combines are necessary. Knowledge of stimulus position rel-
ative to the retina and of eye-position relative to the head are
both necessary to compute stimulus position relative to the head,
for example. Thus, coordinate transformations depend on multi-
plicative interactions that are inherently symmetric as both terms
are necessary. Driving and contextual interactions are inherently
asymmetric, with context having a secondary, dependent, sta-
tus (Phillips, 2012). Thus, this seems to provide a clear case
where studies of visual impairments in schizophrenia contribute
to our understanding of context-sensitive gain-control in general,
because they indicate that, contrary to previous assumptions, it
needs to be distinguished from coordinate transformation.
Overall, we can conclude that the context-sensitive percep-
tual operations of divisive gain suppression, multiplicative gain
amplification, dynamic Gestalt grouping, and face and object
perception are all impaired in schizophrenic disorders, though
to different extents in different cases and conditions. This evi-
dence shows that such impairments can occur at multiple levels
of visual processing, and it suggests that they probably also
occur in other modalities. These impairments are not constant
over time. Some have been demonstrated to be state-sensitive
in that they are more pronounced when patients are acutely
psychotic compared to when their symptoms are in remis-
sion (Uhlhaas et al., 2005; Silverstein and Keane, 2009; Keane
et al., in press; Silverstein et al., submitted, this research topic).
Moreover, some of these state-sensitive impairments also occur
in healthy volunteers administered ketamine, an NMDA antago-
nist (Uhlhaas et al., 2007; Morgan et al., 2011), as expected given
the major contribution of NMDARs to gain-control according to
our theory.
NEURONAL MECHANISMS FOR CONTEXT-SENSITIVE GAIN-CONTROL
ARE IMPAIRED IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
The classical neuromodulators that have long been implicated in
schizophrenia, such as dopamine and acetylcholine, provide an
obvious form of gain-control. Their effects are slow and diffuse,
however, whereas the cognitive interactions that are most obvi-
ously impaired in schizophrenia must have high temporo-spatial
specificity because they convey detailed cognitive content. Gain-
controlling interactions within and between the glutamatergic
and GABAergic systems that convey that content must there-
fore also be involved, so our focus here is on the evidence that
they do indeed play a central role in the pathophysiology of
schizophrenia.
Some of the interactions that control gain are produced
via direct NMDAR-mediated interactions between pyramidal
cells, as reviewed in sub-section There are Various Local-Circuit
and Cellular Mechanisms for Context-Sensitive Gain-Control.
There is ample evidence that NMDAR-mediated signaling is
impaired in schizophrenia as reviewed many times elsewhere
(e.g., Phillips and Silverstein, 2003; Loh et al., 2007; Corlett
et al., 2010; Kantrowitz and Javitt, 2010; Moghaddam and
Javitt, 2012). Furthermore, a review of the evidence on genetic
susceptibility and gene expression concluded that, although
there are probably direct and indirect links to both dopamin-
ergic and GABAergic signaling, glutamate transmission via
NMDARs is especially implicated (Harrison and Weinberger,
2005). Conclusive evidence that NMDAR hypofunction can pro-
duce many schizophrenic symptoms comes from an autoim-
mune disease first reported in 2007. This is an anti-NMDAR
encephalitis that progressively reduces the activity of NMDARs
by capping and internalizing them (Hughes et al., 2010). Patients
present with acute schizophrenia-like symptoms, including para-
noia. They are often admitted to psychiatric institutions and later
develop severe catatonia, catalepsy, and stereotyped movement
disorders. This provides unequivocal evidence that NMDAR-
hypofunction can produce symptoms of schizophrenia, as we
have long supposed.
Though less dense than on pyramidal cells, there are also
NMDARs on the inhibitory interneurons on which several of the
other mechanisms for context-sensitive gain-control discussed
above depend. There is plenty of evidence that interneuron
activity is also impaired in schizophrenia. Multiple studies have
reported alterations inmarkers of inhibitory GABAergic neuronal
activity (e.g., Lewis et al., 2005; Gonzalez-Burgos et al., 2010;
Lewis, 2012), including their association with reduced center-
surround suppression in visual cortex (Yoon et al., 2010). This
deficit appears to be particularly pronounced in the subset of
GABAergic neurons that express the calcium-binding protein PV
(Hashimoto et al., 2003). Thus, this provides another route by
which NMDAR-hypofunction could contribute to some of the
deficits in schizophrenia. For example, when transgenic mice are
generated in which NMDARs are selectively deleted from corti-
cal and hippocampal GABAergic PV interneurons this produces
selective molecular, physiological, and behavioral changes simi-
lar to some in schizophrenia (Nakazawa et al., 2012). Behrens
and Sejnowski (2009) review evidence suggesting how dysregula-
tion of PV interneurons in the developing cortex could explain
the late onset of schizophrenic symptoms as well as the differ-
ences between the effects of brief and prolonged exposure to
NMDA antagonists (Jentsch and Roth, 1999). The division of PV
interneurons into two major classes is based on the principal tar-
get of their axon terminals. The axon terminals of the basket cell
class target the cell body of pyramidal neurons and their proxi-
mal dendrites. The other major class, chandelier cells, gives rise
to terminals that exclusively target the axon initial segments of
pyramidal cells. There is evidence that both classes are impaired
in a way that is specific to schizophrenia (Lewis et al., 2005;
Lewis, 2012). PV interneurons also play a major role in setting
the levels of temporal precision. This suggests that their impair-
ments may play a major role in the reduced temporal precision of
figure-ground segregation in schizophrenia reported by Hancock
et al. (2008). Further evidence for the role of PV interneurons
and synchronized rhythms in the development of schizophrenia is
provided by Lee et al. (2012) who report that, in a neurodevelop-
mental rat model of schizophrenia, adolescent cognitive training
changed PV-labeling in mature prefrontal interneurons, normal-
ized the synchrony of neural oscillations between the left and right
hippocampi, and prevented adult cognitive impairment.
Impairments of inhibitory interneuron activity could thus
have several cognitive consequences. Many researchers, such as
Lewis (2012), focus on consequences for WM and executive
functions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. We agree that dys-
functions of PV interneurons have consequences for WM and
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executive function, but from our perspective that provides far
too narrow a focus as argued above. There is no good evidence
linking the many selective impairments of perception reviewed
here and elsewhere to WM or executive impairments. Effects
of PV GABAergic impairment could also include many other
cognitive functions as a consequence of their pivotal role in tem-
porally precise activities including the generation and timing of
rhythmic activity in the gamma frequency range (Cobb et al.,
1995; Pouille and Scanziani, 2001). It is well-established that a
wide range of cognitive deficits are associated with NMDAR-
hypofunction and changed gamma-band activity in schizophre-
nia (Dzirasa et al., 2009; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010). Uhlhaas
and Singer (2012) review further evidence showing that synchro-
nization of high-frequency rhythms is essential for the dynamic
coordination of activities that are impaired in schizophrenia.
They also summarize evidence suggesting that impaired long-
range dynamic coordination of activity across brain-regions may
be central to both of these disorders. The effects of impaired
NMDAR-mediated neurotransmission on pyramidal cells and PV
interneurons are particularly implicated. For example, the corre-
lation between reduced GABAergic tone and reduced surround
suppression in schizophrenia (Yoon et al., 2010) is probably
mediated by gamma frequency oscillations, as recent research
indicates a strong relationship between these three phenomena
in healthy humans (Edden et al., 2009). Uhlhaas and Singer
(2012) note many similarities between schizophrenia and autistic
spectrum disorders (ASD) with respect to changes in rhythmic
synchronization. Most of the paradigms used to study vision
in schizophrenia have also been used extensively to study autis-
tic perception, but very few firm conclusions can be drawn
from all that evidence (Simmons et al., 2009). The possibil-
ity that a greater emphasis on context-sensitive gain-control as
attempted here may reveal more order in all the evidence con-
cerning both functions and mechanisms in ASD remains to
be explored.
In addition to PV interneurons, other classes of inhibitory
interneuron also contribute to context-sensitive gain-control.
Evidence that somatostatin expressing interneurons (SOM
interneurons), such as Martinotti cells, play a major role in
surround suppression (Adesnik et al., 2012) was reviewed in sub-
section There are Various Local-Circuit and Cellular Mechanisms
for Context-Sensitive Gain-Control. There is evidence for SOM
interneuron impairment in schizophrenia (Morris et al., 2008),
and surround suppression is one of the forms of context-sensitive
gain-control shown to be impaired in schizophrenia. Therefore,
that impairment may be due to impairments of SOM interneuron
activity.
Overall, the neurobiological evidence suggests that schizophre-
nia involves impairments of: (1) NMDAR-mediated interac-
tions between cortical pyramidal cells, (2) the activities of PV
inhibitory interneurons, and (3) the activities of SOM inhibitory
interneurons. The interneuron impairments could, at least in
part, be due to reductions in their NMDA-mediated synaptic
input. All three mechanisms play a major role in context-sensitive
gain-control, as outlined in section Context-Sensitive Gain-
Control Plays a Central Role in Brain Function and Mental Life.
An important direction for future research is therefore to relate
these physiological impairments to the various signs and symp-
toms of schizophrenia. As noted above, there is growing evidence
for: (1) state-sensitivity of impairments in context-sensitive gain-
control in schizophrenia (Silverstein et al., 1996; Uhlhaas et al.,
2005; Silverstein and Keane, 2009; Keane et al., in press; Silverstein
et al., submitted); (2) relationships between reduced contextual
effects in perception and fragmentation in thinking (Uhlhaas
et al., 2006b; Horton and Silverstein, 2011; Silverstein and Keane,
2011); and (3) relationships between abnormal GABAergic activ-
ity and context-sensitive gain-control in schizophrenia (Yoon
et al., 2010). Symptoms are, by definition, state related, and many
theories now relate positive and disorganized symptoms of psy-
chosis to altered states of NMDARs and interneuron activity.
However, the development of pharmacotherapy on the basis of
these theories, though promising, has not yet clearly improved
on clozapine, which has been available for 50 years (Barch, 2010;
Moghaddam and Javitt, 2012). This may, in part, be due to the
difficulty of specifying clinically optimal doses. It could also be
related to the need to distinguish between subtypes of recep-
tor and post-synaptic cell. For example, if impairments are due
to reduced activity of only a particular NMDAR subtype on a
particular class of post-synaptic cell, then that would not be
overcome by a systemic enhancement of NMDAR activity in gen-
eral. Therefore, we need a better understanding of the different
functional roles and developmental trajectories of the different
subtypes of NMDAR.
THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA ARE RELATED TO
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE AND GAIN-CONTROL
Psychiatrists have often concluded that contextual regulation of
ongoing processing is particularly relevant to the induction of
thought disorder (e.g., Barrera et al., 2005). Over the last few
years this possibility has been developed into rigorously formu-
lated theories that focus on the use of context to guide processing
toward inferences that are both coherently related to each other
and well adapted to the current circumstances. These theories
often assume a form of hierarchical Bayesian inference that adapts
and learns by reducing prediction error, where the predictions
arise from higher levels of processing (e.g., Friston, 2010). In addi-
tion, we emphasize that predictive inputs are also provided by
lateral interactions within levels. Such theories have been used
to explain hallucinations (e.g., Friston, 2005) and various forms
of delusion (e.g., Hemsley and Garety, 1986; Garety et al., 2001;
Corlett et al., 2007; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Clark, 2013). In
essence, to the extent that perception is under-constrained by
prior experience of statistical regularities in the world, misper-
ceptions and false attributions of meanings can result. These can
produce a sense that the world is changing, giving rise to delu-
sional explanations for these subjective changes. Delusions of
agency are well-explained by these models on the assumption
that they arise from reduced precision in the predictions of self-
induced sensory signals (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Stephan et al.,
2009; Synofzik et al., 2010). In section Context-Sensitive Gain-
Control Plays a Central Role in Brain Function and Mental Life
we cited work showing how theories of this kind can explain
the normal sense of conscious presence as arising from the cor-
rect prediction of interoceptive signals (Seth et al., 2011). That
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theory explains how disorders of both conscious presence and
emotion could arise from reductions in the context-sensitivity
and precision of probabilistic inference. Such theories can explain
many of the psychotic symptoms that are seen in schizophre-
nia patients. Thus, they may provide important insights into the
well-established symptoms of schizophrenia, and all depend upon
context-sensitive gain-control. They imply a distinction between
drivers and modulators because the predictions that are central
to these accounts are thought to be modulatory and implemented
by specialized synaptic interactions, such as those using NMDARs
and inhibitory interneurons. Though we are not convinced by
some aspects of the theories based on predictive coding (Phillips,
2013; Silverstein, in press), we agree with their emphasis upon
the necessity of using probabilistic inference to interpret inte-
roceptive inputs as well as those from the external world, and
we emphasize the role of context-sensitive gain-control in doing
that. Many of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia can thus be
seen as arising from predictions that are pathologically imprecise
because inadequate use is made of context to make them more
precise. The use of contextual modulation can also enable the
selection of perceptual interpretations or motor commands that
have low probability overall, but high probability in special con-
texts. Thus, in addition to the symptoms noted above, weakened
context-sensitivity could also lead to various other impairments
of perception, thought, and action. Recent evidence in support
of this is that reduced application of a convexity prior during
perception of a hollow mask can lead to more veridical per-
ception of such stimuli by schizophrenia patients. Furthermore,
the extent of veridical perception by such patients was related
to higher levels of hallucination and delusion, and to fewer days
since last hospital discharge (Keane et al., in press). Moreover, this
reduced sensitivity to the “hollow-mask illusion” has been shown,
in dynamic causal modeling analyses of ERP and fMRI data, to
be due to reduced top-down modulation of occipital lobe out-
put in people with schizophrenia (Dima et al., 2009, 2010), as our
theory predicts.
DIFFICULTIES FOR THE HYPOTHESES PROPOSED AND
MAJOR ASPECTS TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED
Hypotheses as general and abstract as ours cannot be confirmed
or refuted by a single definitive experiment. Nevertheless, they can
be strengthened or weakened by further evidence. For example, if
further studies reveal many perceptual deficits in schizophrenia
that are neither primary nor secondary consequences of impaired
context-sensitive gain-control then our hypothesis concerning
the functional impairments in schizophrenia would need to be
amended. It will therefore be of great interest to see whether other
papers published as part of this Frontiers Research Topic reveal
such deficits. If schizophrenia were shown to be due to impair-
ments of mechanisms unrelated to context-sensitive gain-control
then our hypothesis concerning the neuronal bases of schizophre-
nia could be rejected. Our hypotheses carry many implications
concerning mechanisms that can be tested and developed by
further work. Indeed, differences between our emphases now
and those in Phillips and Silverstein (2003) show this clearly.
Then we placed great emphasis on the role of NMDAR-mediated
interactions between pyramidal cells as the mechanism for
context-sensitive gain-control. Now we also place great empha-
sis on the role of PV interneurons because recent findings, such
as those using optogenetic techniques, demonstrate that they
are well-suited to perform context-sensitive gain-control (Atallah
et al., 2012).
Most fundamentally, our hypotheses depend upon the dis-
tinction between context-sensitive gain-control and the driving
signals that convey content. If that distinction were shown to be
misleading or of no use then our perspective could be justifiably
ignored. Thoughmany arguments and findings have been offered
in favor of such a distinction by ourselves and others, some
researchers remain unconvinced, so we acknowledge that this
fundamental distinction remains open to question. Furthermore,
we assume that presentation of the distinction as dichotomous
is merely a heuristic simplification, but we have not given exam-
ples of cases that are intermediate between the two poles of the
distinction.
Theories founded on the notion of optimal Bayesian infer-
ence have been challenged in various ways (e.g., Jones and Love,
2011). For example, Bowers and Davis (2012) argue that such
theories are difficult to test because post-hoc assumptions about
priors or likelihoods can be used to explain almost anything.
They also argue that human inference is often not optimal, and
that the neurobiological evidence for such theories is weak. Clark
(2013) also notes that, being founded on the narrow goal of
reducing prediction error, these Bayesian theories present a bleak
desert-landscape view of mental life. Though most commenta-
tors on his Behavioural and Brain Sciences target article support
his enthusiasm for predictive processing, several raise other diffi-
culties that our perspective may help reduce. First, one difficulty
often raised concerns optimality, but we do not assume optimal-
ity. On the contrary, we argue that the conditions for optimality
at the systems-level can be met only in exceptionally simple cases
(Phillips, 2012). Second, the neurobiological evidence for our
hypotheses is strong and rapidly becoming stronger as it is sup-
ported by the optogenetic evidence that is now being used to
explore the mechanisms of context-sensitive gain-control. Third,
the theory of Coherent Infomax that underlies the hypothe-
ses proposed in this paper avoids the desert-landscape criticism
by emphasizing the objective of maximizing coherent inference
rather than that of reducing prediction error (Phillips et al., 1995;
Kay and Phillips, 1997, 2010; Phillips, 2013). Finally, another dif-
ficulty facing any simple unifying theory is the need to explain
the endless diversity of cognitive capabilities. Our perspective has
to some extent met this need by showing that context-sensitive
gain-control in visual size-perception varies greatly across people
of different ages (Doherty et al., 2009), sex (Phillips et al., 2004),
and culture (Doherty et al., 2008), but those studies are merely
the first few steps into a largely unexplored territory.
Plenty of other difficulties and undeveloped possibilities
remain. We cannot yet claim that all of the symptoms associated
with schizophrenia are due to impairments of context-sensitive
gain-control or their secondary consequences. Nor do we yet have
fully adequate answers to questions concerning relations between
schizophrenia-related impairments and the coordinate transfor-
mations that some see as a foremost function of gain-control.
Is coordinate transformation impaired in schizophrenia or not?
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If not, why not? Is it because the form of gain-control involved in
coordinate transformation is not context-sensitive in the way that
the others are? Relations between classical neuromodulation and
the more locally specific gain-control that we have emphasized
also need to be further clarified. We expect them to be complex,
and to operate in both directions. There is also much that needs
to be clarified concerning the full range of schizophrenia-related
deficits in visual perception. For example, it is well-established
that these include changes in visual masking (Green et al., 2011).
Such deficits may be related to the reduced temporal precision
shown by Hancock et al. (2008) and to the impairments of PV
inhibitory interneurons emphasize above, but we have not yet
examined that possibility adequately.
Overall, our view of the difficulties and immaturities faced by
our perspective is that they offer far more opportunity for healthy
growth than they do for fatal decline. It will be of great interest
to see whether developments over the coming years justify that
optimism.
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